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STREAMLINING ANTITRUST LITIGATION BY
"FACIAL EXAMINATION" OF RESTRAINTS:
THE BURGER COURT AND THE PER SE - RULE
OF REASON DISTINCTION
Edward Brunet*
Courts vacillate in their choice of methods for determining whether to
test an alleged trade restraint under a rule of reason or per se approach.
They may label that restraint a per se violation of antitrust law for a vari-
ety of reasons. A court may reach that conclusion by labeling a restraint'
"pernicious,"' I "manifestly anticompetitive, ' 2 "naked," ' 3 or by inquir-
ing whether the restraint is one with which the judiciary has "consider-
able experience." 4 A court may consider a per se approach a conclusive
presumption5 or a rule of evidence banning efficiency defenses. 6 While a
per se approach is said to-reduce litigation costs, some trial courts hold
full rule of reason trials only to find a restraint per se illegal at the conclu-
sion of the litigation. 7 Similarly, the rule of reason often means a balanc-
ing of procompetitive and anticompetitive considerations. 8 It can also
* Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School; B.A. 1966, Northwestern University; J.D.
1969, University of Illinois; LL.M. 1972, University of Virginia.
1. E.g., Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); Gough v. Rossmoor
Corp., 585 F.2d 381, 386 (9th Cir. 1978) (quoting Northern Pac. R.R. Co.), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
936 (1979); Moraine Prods. v. ICI Am., Inc., 538 F.2d 134, 144 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Mercedes-BenzofN. Am., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
2. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 (1977).
3. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972); White Motor Co. v. United
States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963); United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir.
1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF ANTi-
TRUST 197-212 (1977).
4. E.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607-08 (1972); Abadir & Co. v.
First Miss. Corp., 651 F.2d 422,428 (5th Cir. 1981); Mackey v. National Football League, 543 F.2d
606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Moraine Prods. v. ICI Am., Inc.,
538 F.2d 134, 144 (7th Cir. 1976) ("sufficient prior experience").
5. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. 1551, 1556 (1984); Arizona v. Mari-
copa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
6. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
7. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Board of Re-
gents of Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1311 (W.D. Okla.
1982), affdand modified, 707 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1983), affid, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984); Mackey v.
National Football League, 407 F. Supp. 1000, 1003, 1007 (D. Minn. 1975), affd and modified, 543
F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); United States v. National Soc'y of
Professional Eng'rs, 389 F. Supp. 1193, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974), aff d, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Continential T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977); Valley
Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 678 F.2d 742, 745 (7th Cir. 1982); Muenster Butane, Inc.
v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 296 (5th Cir. 1981).
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involve, however, an inquiry into whether the alleged restraint is neces-
sary to a procompetitive efficiency, 9 or, phrased differently, reduces
competition in the least intrusive fashion. 10 In short, decisions to apply
per se or rule of reason approaches are in methodological disarray.
Authorities concur that the crucial distinction between per se and rule
of reason methods is elusive. Justice Fortas maintained that "'[t]here is no
single test to determine when the record adequately shows an 'unreason-
able restraint of trade.' "I Maxwell Blecher, a preeminent antitrust liti-
gator, described the rule of reason as "a euphemism for an endless eco-
nomic inquiry resulting in a defense verdict."'12 Speaking at the 1982
annual meeting of the American Bar Association, Robert Taylor com-
pared the rule of reason to a Peanuts cartoon. 13
Against a backdrop of a definitional skepticism, this article focuses on
the important Burger Court contribution to the per se and rule of reason
approaches. The Burger Court now requires a facial examination of anti-
trust restraints that may improve the lethargic process of antitrust litiga-
tion. Much of the article concerns the differences between the per se and
rule of reason tests. The Burger Court's decisions, however, require that
careful attention be given to the similar and complementary features of
the rule of reason and per se methods. The article examines carefully the
methodologies courts employ to classify alleged restraints as either per se
or rule of reason and concludes that the line between these two ap-
proaches is becoming increasingly fuzzy. Rather than presenting two rad-
ically different antitrust tests, the Burger Court's use of the per se and rule
of reason tests emphasizes similar concerns.
The chief focus of this article, then, is antitrust procedure and, in par-
ticular, close scrutiny of the process used by the Burger Court to classify
a restraint as either per se or rule of reason. Antitrust procedure has been
the subject of intense critical commentary. 14 Antitrust cases are often
9. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y. 457 U.S. 332 (1982): Broadcast Music. Inc. v.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys.. Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979): United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co..
85 F. 271. 280-81 (6th Cir. 1898). modified. 175 U.S. 211 (1899): see also infra note 145.
10. See White Motor Co. v. United States. 372 U.S. 253. 270 (1963) (Brennan. J.. concurring).
Twin City Sportservice. Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co.. 676 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982). cert
denied. 103 S. Ct. 364 (1982): Rosebrough Monument Co. v. Memorial Park Cemetery Assoc.. 666
F.2d 1130, 1145 (8th Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982): see also infra note 145.
I1. United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 339 (1969) (Fortas. J.. concurring).
12. Blecher, Schwinn-An Example of a Genuine Commitnent to Antitrust Law. 44 ANTITRUST
L.J. 550, 553 (1975). Mr. Blecher has helped undercut his own assertion by prevailing recently in a
rule of reason trial against the National Football League. See Los Angeles Mem. Coliseum Comm'n
v. National Football League, 519 F. Supp. 581 (C.D. Cal. 1981). affd. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.
1984).
13. Taylor, Rule of Reason Cases Since National Society of Professional Engineers. 51 ANTti
TRUST L.J. 185, 185 (1982).
14. See, e.g.. Austin, The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Pro-
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termed dinosaurs and assumed to be impossible to streamline meaning-
fully. Recent Burger Court opinions, however, could revolutionize the
past cumbersome progress of antitrust cases.
Part I of this article attempts to discredit and deemphasize often articu-
lated but somewhat empty judicial cliches used to classify alleged anti-
trust restraints. Part II develops the Burger Court theme of a "quick
look" or facial examination of alleged restraints that derives primarily
from four opinions of Justice John Paul Stevens. 15 Part II focuses on the
blurring similarity of modem antitrust treatment of the rule of reason and
per se approaches. Part III, the conclusion, explores important judicial
administration policy implications of the Burger Court's treatment of the
per se - rule of reason distinction. The quick look test encourages in-
creased and efficient use of pre-trial disposition of the threshold issue of
whether to use a per se or rule of reason approach.
I. THE ROLE OF CLICHES IN MODERN SUPREME COURT PER
SE - RULE OF REASON CLASSIFICATION
In past opinions, the Supreme Court offered numerous explanations for
decisions that classified restraints as per se or rule of reason. Although
some were helpful and advanced analysis, others were close to incanta-
tions or cliches, often announced but seldom meaningfully explained or
understood. This part examines the reasons articulated by the Supreme
Court for classifying restraints. While the Supreme Court's recital of
these cliches implies their utility for classifying restraints, close analysis
reveals that these cliches have relatively little bearing on whether a case is
examined under the per se or rule of reason standard.
A. The Prerequisite of Considerable Past Experience with a Restraint
In numerous cases the Supreme Court has reasoned that "'[i]t is only
cedures: Reports on Symptoms But Ignores Causes. 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 873 (1979); Blecher &
Carlo, ToswardMore Effective Handling of Complex Antitrust Cases, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 727 (1980);
Blecher & Woodhead, The Small Prospects for Shrinking the Big Antitrust Case by Procedural Re-
form, II LOYOLA L. REV. 513 (1978).
15. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 104 S. Ct.
2948 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); Broadcast Music, Inc.
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979); Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978). Justice Stevens brings considerable antitrust expertise to the Court. For
almost twenty years, he was a highly respected antitrust attorney in firms noted for their antitrust
specialization. He has also lectured at both the University of Chicago and Northwestem Law
Schools. See BICENTENNIAL COMM=ITEE OFTHE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OFTHE UNITED STATES, JUDGES
OFTHE UNITED STATES 470 (1983); Congressional Quarterly, Inc., GUIDETOTHE SUPREME COURT 866
(1979); New York Times, Nov. 29, 1975, at 1, col. 6.
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after considerable experience with certain business relationships that
courts classify them as per se violations of the Sherman Act."' 6 This
canon of per se - rule of reason classification appears in opinions of vary-
ing vintage. 17 The logic supporting this approach is difficult to fault: since
a per se classification packs a substantial wallop, courts should so classify
a restraint only if they have considerable familiarity with the business
practice involved.
Experience with a particular business practice provides valuable infor-
mation on competitive impact. Yet novel business practices are often lit-
tle more than variations on well known past practices. Inventive antitrust
counselors steer clear of business practices declared per se illegal by "in-
venting around" past per se decisions. Accordingly, the argument that a
restraint is novel and hence subject to the rule of reason is a well-worn
cliche that hardly provides a meaningful "rule" of per se - rule of reason
classification. Instead, this principle of classification provides incentive
for every defendant to contend the alleged restraint is untested.
An examination of the checkered history of the White Motor Co. v.
United States'8 saga is illustrative. The Supreme Court in White Motor
refused to apply a per se approach to the defendant firm's exclusive grants
of territories and restrictions upon dealer sales to government entities.
Justice Douglas' opinion asserted that "[tihis is the first case involving a
territorial restriction in a vertical arrangement; and we know too little of
the actual impact of both that restriction and the one respecting [govern-
mental] customers to reach a conclusion on the bare bones of the docu-
mentary evidence before us." 19 The judicial system learned little from
the White Motor remand for trial since the defendant White Motor entered
into a consent decree preventing it from contracting with dealers "to
limit, allocate or restrict the territories in which, or the persons or classes
of persons to whom, any . . . dealer or other person may sell trucks." 20
Nonetheless, a short three years later in United States v. Arnold Schwint
& Co.2 1 the Supreme Court found a manufacturer's restriction upon deal-
ers' territories and customers per se illegal since the practice "would vi-
olate the ancient rule against restraints on alienation and open the door to
16. United States v. Topco Assocs.. 405 U.S. 596. 607-08 (1972) (citing Van Cise. The Fuore
of Per Se in Antitrust Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 1165 (1964)).
17. E.g.. Broadcast Music. Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.. Inc.. 441 U.S I. 19 n.33
(1979): White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
18. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
19. Id. at 261. The Court's opinion reversed a grant of summary judgment for the plaintiff gov-
emnment and required a trial to test the restraint's legality.
20. United States v. White Motor, 1964 TRADE CASES (CCH) 1 71,195 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
21. 388 U.S. 365 (1967)
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exclusivity of outlets and limitation of territory further than prudence per-
mits. "22
The full story of White Motor ends with the 1977 blockbuster, Conti-
nental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania,23 which overruled the Schwinn case.
The rude overturning of the relatively recent Schwinn rule was due less to
the "experience" gained during the intervening ten years of per se appli-
cation than to a shift in the per se classification approach. 24 The Schwinn
per se prohibition on territorial and customer restraints provided little or
no information regarding competitive impact. The rule of reason classifi-
cation of GTE Sylvania was less the result of business experience than an
ideological shift toward using economic analysis to resolve antitrust ques-
tions.25
Despite the brusque manner with which the Schwinn Court treated the
White Motor "go slow, be sure" approach to per se classification, and
despite the shift in ideology revealed by GTE Sylvania, the Burger Court
cited approvingly the White Motor approach in both United States v.
Topco Associates26 and Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting
Systems.27 In Topco, the Court classified as illegal per se the restriction of
territories by a cooperative purchasing association of supermarket chains
possessing a relatively small percentage of the market. 28 The Supreme
Court's opinion professed willingness to use per se classifications only
after "considerable experience with certain business relationships. ' 29
Yet analysis of the Topco classification indicates that this proposition
played at most a limited role. The Court's main articulated rationale for
labeling the restraint per se illegal was its conclusion that the restraint at
issue was "horizontal" in nature. 30 In the words of Justice Marshall's
Topco opinion, "the restraint in the case is a horizontal one, and, there-
fore, a per se violation of Section 1. '31 Moreover, the Topco ruling re-
versed a trial court finding that focused upon the business impact and
22. Id. at 380.
23. 433 U.S. 36(1977).
24. See infra text accompanying note 66 and authorities cited in note 66.
25. See Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania
Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1977); Sullivan & Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments: Refining
the Scope of Exemptions, Expanding Coverage, and Refining the Rule of Reason. 27 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 265, 322-23 (1979); Zelek, Stem, & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision ModelAfter Sylvania,
68 CALIF. L. REv. 13 (1980).
26. 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972).
27. 441 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1979).
28. The association members possessed market shares ranging from 1.5 to 16% and averaging
6%. 405 U.S. at 600.
29. Id. at 607.
30. Id. at 596, 608. Restraints are considered horizontal if they are formed by competitors and
vertical if they are formed by units within a product's chain of distribution.
31. Id. at 608.
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experience of the alleged restraint and approved the practice after a full
rule of reason trial. The trial judge concluded that the per se classification
"would substantially diminish competition in the supermarket field." 32
Viewed in this context, the Supreme Court's 1972 Topco per se classifica-
tion was not due to any particular reliance upon "experience" with this
restraint but, instead, to a fear of horizontal restraints, and an articulated
tendency to almost routinely and automatically classify horizontal re-
straints per se illegal.
The maturity of the Burger Court's classification approach is apparent
when comparing the Topco approach to the rule of reason classification
used in the 1979 Broadcast Music case. There, the Supreme Court la-
beled the defendant's blanket license to use copyrighted musical compo-
sitions a restraint to be tested under the rule of reason. After citing the
White Motor "considerable experience" approach, Justice White's ma-
jority opinion appeared to particularly emphasize the White Motor princi-
ple: "We have never examined a practice like this one before; indeed, the
Court of Appeals recognized that '[fin dealing with performing rights in
the music industry we confront conditions both in copyright law and in
antitrust law which are sui generis.' 562 F.2d at 132." 33 When the
Broadcast Music case is analyzed closely, however, it is apparent that the
White Motor approach also played a relatively minor role in the Court's
reversal of the Second Circuit's per se categorization. Broadcast Music's
categorization approach rejected fixed labeling-after all, BMI's practice
of charging users a set percentage of their advertising revenue was a tradi-
tional form of "price fixing"-in favor of a comprehensive economic
examination of the restraint. The Second Circuit's fast and easy per se
labeling was improper due to a number of factors. The restraint had po-
tential efficiencies since it replaced the costly negotiations of individual
copyrights between authors and potential users with "the integration of
sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
use." 34 The interpretation allowed composers to avoid a marketing
scheme in which they "are ... unable to compete fully effectively." 35 In
addition to identifying the efficiencies associated with the restraint, Jus-
tice White acknowledged the supporting comfort of the prior Justice De-
partment consent decree authorizing and supervising the blanket license
arrangement and legislative recognition of the efficiencies associated with
compulsory blanket licensing. 36 By emphasizing prior Justice Depart-
32. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031. 1043 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
33. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.. Inc.. 441 U.S. 1. 10 (1979).
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 23.
36. Id. at 13, 15-16 (citing the New Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C. app. & § II 1(d)(5)(A) (1976)
Vol. 60:1, 1984
Streamlining Antitrust Litigation
ment attention and Congressional familiarity with blanket licensing ar-
rangements, Justice White undercut his introductory categorization justi-
fication that the restraint at issue was novel. Indeed, the Court was
expressly acknowledging prior prosecutorial and legislative "experi-
ence" with blanket licensing as a reason to avoid the per se label. Hence,
although Broadcast Music pays lip service to the "no per se unless con-
siderable experience" formula, the decision really suggests that "experi-
ence" and potential efficiencies can result in a rule of reason approach.
The Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society37 decision confirms
that the considerable past experience notion should be treated with cau-
tion and skepticism. There, the Supreme Court found that maximum set
fees claimed by physicians as payment for insured services were illegal
per se. The defendant contended that the per se rule should not be ap-
plied, given the judiciary's lack of prior antitrust experience with the
health care industry. 38 Although the Maricopa opinion gave lip service to
the considerable past experience rhetoric, 39 Justice Stevens' majority
opinion refused to be bound by this well-worn principle. Instead, Mari-
copa employed an alternate method to decide the per se or rule of reason
issue: it examined the restraint summarily to determine its likely procom-
petitive and anticompetitive features. 40 In so doing, Justice Stevens
warned against loose application of the considerable past experience prin-
ciple by asserting that the efficency of the per se rule for streamlining
litigation is inconsistent with the "argument that the per se rule must be
rejustified for every industry that has not been subject to significant anti-
trust litigation." 41
Maricopa's prompt rejection of the considerable past experience jargon
illustrates the greatest defect in the test. Even though a particular industry
may have had little antitrust experience, the specific restraint challenged
can be one with which courts are extremely familiar. In short, the "con-
siderable past experience" idea, while a helpful caution, is not a signifi-
cant determinant of per se - rule of reason classification.
B. Pernicious Restraints
One of the oldest rationales for classifying an alleged restraint per se
(blanket licenses for cable television) and 17 U.S.C. app. § 116(c)(4) (1976) (blanket license for
compositions used in jukeboxes)).
37. 457 U.S. 332(1982).
38. Id. at 349.
39. "[A] new per se rule is not justified until the judiciary obtains considerable rule-of-reason
experience with the particular type of restraint challenged." Id. at 349 n. 19.
40. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text.
41. 457 U.S. 332, 351 (1982).
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illegal derives from the venerable Northern Pacific v. United States4 2 liti-
gation. There, the Supreme Court recited that restraints having a "perni-
cious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue are conclu-
sively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal without
elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use.' 43 This language, termed a "principle of per se un-
reasonableness," 44 is perhaps the most frequently cited explanation for
classifying restraints illegal per se. 45 Restraints termed "pernicious" or
"plainly anticompetitive,"- 46 and hence illegal per se, have occurred in
the price-fixing area. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has used the
"plainly anticompetitive" or "pernicious" labels when dealing with an
agreement to eliminate short term credit4 7 and a prohibition on competi-
tive bidding. 48
Suprisingly, leading decisions sometimes summarily label a restraint
"pernicious" with little accompanying discussion explaining a restraint's
pernicious impact. In the historic Northern Pacific opinion itself, Justice
Black offered only a perfunctory explanation of the requisite pernicious
impact on competition. Justice Black first explained that tying arrange-
ments "deny competitors free access to the market for the tied product..
• because of [the defendant seller's] power or leverage in another mar-
ket." 4 9 Yet Justice Harlan's Northern Pacific dissent pointed cogently to
a trial court finding that "substantially all the tying clauses ... contained
provisos leaving the [alleged tying victim] free to ship by other railroads
when offered either lower rates or . . . superior service." 50 If Justice
Harlan was correct, the restraint's potential anticompetitive impact was
benign or unclear. The majority opinion's second rationale for labeling
the restraint pernicious, that "buyers are forced to forego their free choice
between competing products," 51 has only a tenuous connection to com-
petitive injury. While the ability to operate freely in markets may contrib-
42. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
43. Id. at 5.
44. Id.
45. See, e.g., Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo. Inc. v. Fiat Distribs., 637 F.2d 1376. 1382 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981): Almeda Mall, Inc. v. Houston Lighting & Power Co.. 615
F.2d 343. 350-51 (5th Cir. 1980). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 870 (1980): Smith v. Pro Football. Inc..
593 F.2d 1173, 1181 (D.C. Cir. 1978). United States v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am.. Inc.. 517 F.
Supp. 1369, 1377 (N.D. Cal. 1981); Note, Antitrust-Tying Arrangement Per Se Violation of Sher-
man Act, 27 FORDHAM L. REv 272 (1958).
46. This synonymous phrase was first used in National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
47. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643. 650 (1980).
48. National Soc' yofProfessional Eng'rs, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
49. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1,6 (1958).
50. Id. at 17 (Harlan, J.. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
51. Id. at 6.
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ute positively to an efficient and unregulated market, such "freedom" is
hardly indicative of injury to a competitor or consumer. Indeed, any time
a seller approaches a potential buyer who has previously contracted to
purchase, freedom of choice is diminished. Accordingly, it is difficult to
identify a "pernicious" result in the landmark Northern Pacific case it-
self.
The ideal restraint for the Supreme Court to have first labeled "perni-
cious" is, of course, price fixing among competitors. Classical econom-
ics considers price fixing to be cartel behavior designed to raise price and
restrict output. Even if members of a price fixing cartel lack market
power, or the actual capability of raising prices or reducing supplies, 52
the risks to consumers associated with the attainm6nt of monopoly power
and the spectre of a small combination growing to monopoly proportions
justify a per se rule against horizontal price-fixing competitors without
inquiry into market power.53
It is surprising that tying arrangements were the first restraint to be des-
ignated "pernicious" since tie-ins can enhance efficiency and consumer
welfare. 54 The Burger Court's recent Jefferson Parish Hospital District
No. 2 v. Hyde55 decision exhibited little enthusiasm for the blanket propo-
sition that tying arrangements are pernicious. In Hyde, four members of
the Supreme Court were willing to lift the per se designation from tie-ins
and substitute a rule of reason inquiry. 56 In her concurring opinion, Jus-
tice O'Connor reasoned that past tying cases watered down the per se
label by requiring proof of "sufficient economic power with respect to the
tying product." ' 57 Accordingly, "[t]he per se doctrine in tying cases has
thus always required an elaborate inquiry into the economic effects of the
tying arrangement. "58 The Hyde five-person majority opinion outwardly
retained a per se approach for tie-ins. However, the majority substantially
52. See Landes & Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937 (198 1).
53. That economic theory will justify a per se condemnation of price fixing appears well settled.
See R. BORK, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOX. ch. 13 passim (1978). For an all-out attack on per se rules,
see Note, Fixing the Price Fixing Confusion: A Rule of Reason Approach, 92 YALE L.J. 706, 714
passim (1983).
54. P. AREEDA, ANTrrRusT ANALYSIS 736-38 (3d ed. 1981) (Efficiency examples of tie-ins in-
clude sales of a full line of products, rather than selling related products separately, and coupling
repair service to sale of complicated product.).
55. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984).
56. The Hyde concurring opinion of Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
tices Powell and Rehnquist, constitutes a frontal assault on the regular use of a per se rule in tying
cases and adopts a Chicago-school economic analysis. See id. at 1569.
57. Hyde, 104 S. Ct. at 1570 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Northern Pac. R. R. Co.. 356
U.S. at 6).
58. Hyde, 104S. Ct. at 1570.
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increased the proof requirements for establishing per se liability and, in so
doing, created a per se tying rule extremely difficult to satisfy. 59
Although Burger Court antitrust decisions contain lengthy and helpful
discussions explaining the anticompetitive impact of the restraint at is-
sue, 60 these decisions continue to cite with approval the pernicious evil
per se rationale. In GTE Sylvania itself, Justice Powell's opinion unequi-
vocally pronounced that "[pier se rules . . . are appropriate only when
they relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive" and then pro-
ceeded to quote approvingly the Northern Pacific "pernicious effect"
language. 6 1 Similar language, terming a per se approach proper when the
restraint is "plainly anticompetitive," can be found in National Society of
Professional Engineers v. United States,62 Broadcast Music Inc. v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting Systems, 63 and Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales,
Inc. 64
The Court's continued incantation of the "pernicious" or "manifestly
anticompetive" terminology for per se classification has a mixed effect.
The focus on anticompetitive effect is altogether positive and provides
real guidance to a court faced with an allegedly per se illegal restraint. 65
However, it is inaccurate to place much reliance on the "pernicious" la-
bel itself. Rather than resort to a labeling process, the Burger Court has
emphasized economic analysis of the restraint as the dominant criterion
for determining a per se designation. 66 If, upon careful economic analy-
59. Under the Hyde majority approach, a tie-in is per se illegal only if a "forced" sale of two
economically distinct products is probable. The proof determinant of "'forcing" will normally be the
anticompetitive impact of the "forced" sale: market power in the tying product will be the focus. Id.
at 1560-61. Although these requirements are technically part of a per se prima facie case. the focus
upon the economic impact of the restraint smacks of the rule of reason. See infra text accompanying
notes 83-87. In a sense, the Supreme Court has integrated rule of reason proof requirements with
what is still called a per se rule. See Dam. Fortner Enterprises v. United States Steel: Neither a
Borrower Nor a Lender Be, 1969 Sup CT REV 1 (1969). For economic analysis of tying arrange-
ments see Bowman. Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem. 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957): Bur-
stein, A Theory ofFull Line Forcing, 55 Nw- U.L. REV 62 (1960).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 88-124.
61. Continental T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
62. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States. 435 U.S. 679. 692 (1978) (defining
per se category as "agreements whose nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that
no elaborate study of the industry is needed to establish their illegality").
63. 441 U.S. 1.8(1979).
64. 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980).
65. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84 and 165-67.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 83-84. Numerous commentators have focused upon the
Burger Court shift to economic analysis. See. e.g., Handler. Changing Trends in Antitrust Doctrines:
An Unprecedented Supreme Court Tern-1977. 77 COLUM L. REV 979 (1977): Pitofsky. The Syl-
vania Case: Antitrust Analy''sis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUt L. REV I ( 1978): Pos-
ner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision. 45 U.
Ctt L. REV 1 (1977): Note, Sylvania and Vertical Restraints on Distribution. 19 B.C.L. REV 751
(1978).
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sis, a restraint's anticompetitive impact appears "pernicious," then a per
se categorization is justified. However, labeling a restraint "pernicious"
has sometimes had a negative effect. Too often simply terming an alleged
restraint "pernicious" substitutes labeling for the careful economic anal-
ysis needed to categorize a restraint properly.
C. Bright Line Effect
In several prior cases the Supreme Court has highlighted the positive
results of a per se classification. Such classifications cast a "bright line"
to the legally aware business community and, accordingly, provide useful
guidance. In Northern Pacific, per se rules were said to make condemned
practices "more certain to the benefit of everyone concerned."67 The
Topco decision also commented favorably upon the bright line effect, rea-
soning that "[w]ithout the per se rules, businessmen would be left with
little to aid them in predicting in any particular case what courts will find
to be legal and illegal under the Sherman Act." 68 Justice Powell's GTE
Sylvania opinion also recognized that "per se rules tend to provide guid-
ance to the business community.' '69 Similarly, Maricopa emphasized the
"business certainty" associated with a per se approach. 70
However, the bright line effect is not a per se - rule of reason classifica-
tion tool. Although the bright line impact offers a useful justification for
per se rules, it offers no coherent test for deciding whether a particular
restraint should be classified per se illegal. Accordingly, the bright line
effect provides more of a supporting rationale for per se rules than an
analytic test. The GTE Sylvania majority opinion recognized this when it
identified the bright line effect and then pointed out that "these advan-
tages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se
rules. ''71
D. Streamlining Litigation
Per se rules also have the effect of streamlining or simplifying poten-
tially complicated antitrust litigation. A per se designation makes inad-
missible reasonableness justifications supporting a restraint and, accord-
67. Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
68. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n. 10 (1972).
69. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977).
70. Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982).
71. 433 U.S. at 50 n. 16. The Court went on to point out that if the bright line technique provided
a definition of per se liablity "all of antitrust law would be reduced to per se rules, thus introducing
an unintended and undesirable rigidity in the law." Id.
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ingly, acts as a rule of evidence. 72 Once the plaintiff proves the existence
of a restraint meriting per se treatment, a defendant may either rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case or raise those few antitrust defenses unrelated
to the restraint's putative procompetitive considerations. 73 The many is-
sues accompanying a rule of reason trial are eliminated from a per se
case. In per se litigation the expenditure of attorneys' fees and judicial
resources is considerably less than in complicated rule of reason trials. A
rule of reason inquiry is comparatively wide open in terms of proof. The
court admits virtually any evidence concerning the purpose, history, or
economic impact of a challenged restraint. 74
Courts have consistently identified the efficiency of per se litigation.
The landmark Northern Pacific opinion articulated the cost-savings im-
pact of the per se designation:
This principle of per se unreasonableness ... also avoids the necessity for
an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in an
effort to determine at large whether particular restraint has been unreason-
able-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken. 75
Justice White's Broadcast Music opinion quoted the above language
approvingly in connection with the observation that the per se rule is "a
valid and useful tool of antitrust policy and enforcement.' 76 The GTE
Sylvania opinion commented that a per se rule will "minimize the bur-
dens on litigants and the judicial system of the more complex rule of rea-
son trials.' 77
Justice Marshall delivered perhaps the most eloquent articulation ex-
plaining the judicial administration advantages of per se liability in his
United States v. Container Corp. dissent:
Per se rules always contain a degree of arbitrariness. They are justified on
the assumption that the gains from imposition of the rule will far outweigh
the losses and that significant administrative advantages will result. In other
words, the potential competitive harm plus the administrative costs of deter-
mining in what particular situations the practice may be harmful must far
outweigh the benefits that may result. If the potential benefits in the
72 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940): Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
73. E.g. a Clayton Act statute of limitations defense. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(b) (1982).
74. For the classic expansive definition of the rule of reason, see Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). The Burger Court frequently quotes the Chicago Bd. of Trade
version of the rule of reason. See, e.g., Topco, 405 U.S. at 607.
75. Northern Pac. R.R. Co., 356 U.S. at 5.
76. Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 8.
77. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50n. 16.
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aggregate are outweighed to this degree, then they are simply not worth
identifying in individual cases. 78
The particularly useful facet of Justice Marshall's analysis is his recogni-
tion of the cost savings associated with avoiding a rule of reason trial and
his integration of these savings into a general formula. Justice Marshall
expressed this point in somewhat different terms in his Topco majority
opinion when he theorized that congressional restriction of per se rules
would "leave courts free to ramble through the wilds of economic theory
in order to maintain a flexible approach." 79 In Maricopa, Justice Stevens
voiced a similar point in describing the rule of reason as entailing "signif-
icant costs" and requiring "extensive and complex" litigation regarding
the restraint's purpose or effect. 80 Justice Stevens also acknowledged the
trade-off involved in the decision to use a per se rule by asserting, in
dictum, that a per se approach exists to promote "business certainty and
litigation efficiency" despite the "invalidation of some agreements that a
fullblown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable." 81
However, judicial economy, like the bright line effect, is at most a
useful by-product of a per se approach. The streamlining of litigation
does not afford a basis for determining whether to designate a particular
suspect restraint illegal per se. While a recognition that per se rules
streamline litigation aids our understanding, this helpful realization offers
no test for distinguishing a rule of reason restraint from a per se re-
straint.82 As Part II of this article demonstrates, recent Burger Court deci-
sions indicate that the methodologies of per se and rule of reason focus
similarly on the economic impact of an alleged restraint and differ only in
degree and timing; a per se approach tests economic impact before the
trial, using a pre-trial record, whereas the rule of reason normally requires
a full trial with a much more detailed inquiry as to economic impact.
78. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting).
79. Topco, 405 U.S. at 609-10 n.10. For the Burger Court's philosophical shift relying upon
economic theory, see authorities cited supra in note 66. Students of economic regulation will recall
Justice Marshall's inconsistent embracing of economic theory as a useful policy tool. Marshall's
economic reasoning formed the basis of an eloquent dissent in United States v. Container Corp. of
America, 393 U.S. 333, 341 (1969), but was eschewed in favor of the simplicity of per se liability in
Topco. For a different Marshall opinion particularly critical of the Supreme Court's use of economic
theory, see American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 392 U.S. 571,
586 n.16 (1968) ("This Court is not particularly suited to pass on the merits of the [parties'] eco-
nomic arguments .... ). Yet, even after articulating this concern Justice Marshall went on to justify
his holding in economic terms.
80. 457 U.S. at 343 (1982).
81. Id. (footnote omitted).
82. For Supreme Court acknowledgement of this limitation of the bright line effect, see GTE
Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 50 n. 16 (streamlining litigation and bright line effect "not sufficient . .. to
justify the creation of per se rules").
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I1. THE DOMINANCE OF ECONOMIC IMPACT AND THE
SIMILARITY OF MODERN PER SE AND RULE OF REASON
APPROACHES: FACIAL COMPETITIVE IMPACT ANALYSIS
OF EACH RESTRAINT
There is no dispute that the Burger Court has emphasized competitive
impact in antitrust decisions. Lower courts and legal commentators con-
cur in identifying the economic analysis of the rule of reason as the prime
Burger Court working determinant in antitrust litigation. 83
Burger Court decisions require careful analysis of competitive impact
in rule of reason cases. In GTE Sylvania, Justice Powell termed the rule
of reason "the prevailing standard of analysis" and provided this defini-
tion: "Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a
case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as im-
posing an unreasonable restraint on competition.' 84 The authority relied
upon by Justice Powell was, not surprisingly, Justice Brandeis' famous
Chicago Board of Trade v. United States formulation of the rule. 85 In
GTE Sylvania, Justice Powell applied Brandeis' broad approach to the
rule of reason by focusing upon the purpose and economic effect of de-
fendant Sylvania's restriction upon dealer location. The vertical restraint
at issue could promote interbrand competition in numerous ways. It might
aid new firms to enter markets by sparking "competent and agressive re-
tailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often
required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer.'* 86
This investment could enhance product service and repair since competi-
tor dealers in the same location would be unable to take a "free ride" on
83. See, e.g., Muenster Butane. Inc. v. Stewart Co. 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981)(rule of reason
validates a wholesale restriction upon unauthorized dealer sales due to presence of fierce interbrand
competition and promotional efficiencies); Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo, Inc. v. Fiat Distributors. Inc..
637 F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 831 (1981): Valley Liquors. Inc.. v. Renfield
Importers. Ltd., 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner. J.): Handler. supra note 66: Posner. supra
note 66; Zelek, Stem. & Dunfee, A Rule of Reason Decision Model After Sylvania. 68 CAL L. RE"
13(1980).
84. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977) (footnote omitted).
85. The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to
the business to which the restraint is applied: its condition before and after the restraint was
imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The history of the restraint.
the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy. the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is not because a good intention will save an
otherwise objectionable regulation or the reverse; but because knowledge of intent may help the
court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
86. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.. 433 U.S. 36. 55 (1977).
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another firm's service and repair. 87 The manufacturer's goodwill and
product competitiveness would increase.
However, it is wrong to limit Burger Court antitrust decisions to requir-
ing a careful economic analysis only in cases first characterized as appro-
priate for rule of reason treatment. Decisions of the Burger Court and
earlier Supreme Courts illustrate that competitive impact should be
closely examined in all antitrust cases and particularly in those cases in-
volving restraints not comfortably classified as either per se or rule of
reason.
Broadcast Music88 is illustrative and constitutes an extremely impor-
tant extension of the GTE Sylvania philosophy of competitive impact.
There, the Supreme Court rejected the application of a per se approach to
test the blanket copyright licenses for musical compositions used by BMI
and ASCAP. Each defendant packaged the musical compositions of its
member copyright owners into one blanket license at set fees. The blanket
license allowed a buyer such as C.B.S. the unlimited right to perform any
number of compositions for a set term. Although Justice White's opinion
conceded that the two defendants' numerous members had joined to-
gether to sell at one price, he refused to simplistically and automatically
label the restraint "price fixing." Instead, he closely examined the eco-
nomic purpose and likely effect of the alleged restraint in rejecting the
conclusion of the Second Circuit that a per se approach was applicable:
[I]n characterizing this conduct under the per se rule, our inquiry must focus
on whether the effect and, here because it tends to show effect, . . . the
purpose of the practice are to threaten the proper operation of our predomi-
nantly free-market economy- that is, whether the practicefacially appears
to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output, and in what portion of the market, or instead one de-
signed to "increase economic efficiency and render markets more, rather
than less, competitive." 89
Taken literally, Justice White's clear direction was to focus on anticom-
petitive effect in all antitrust cases as a methodology used to decide
whether to apply a per se or rule of reason approach. This threshold "in-
quiry" was to be conducted "facially": presumably by a court as a matter
of law and probably prior to a trial. Measured in this fashion, the blanket
87. Id. at 55 (citing Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An Analysis of the Re-
stricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv.
282, 285 (1975); P. SAMUELSON. ECONOMICS 506-07 (10th ed. 1976)).
88. 441U.S. 1(1979).
89. Id. at 19-20 (citing United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441 n.16
(1978); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978); Continen-
tal T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n. 16 (1977); Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958)) (emphasis added).
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license at issue overcame the per se hurdle: the arrangement developed
"out of the practical situation in the market place" to permit "rapid. and
indemnified access to any and all of the repertory of compositions," and
to avoid the expense of individual sales transactions. 90 In short, transac-
tion costs were lowered for both buyers and sellers by devices necessary
to efficiently license musical compositions.
Other Burger Court opinions strongly support this simplified antitrust
methodology that closes the gap between the per se and rule of reason
approaches. Even per se opinions focus on anticompetitive effect in de-
ciding whether to apply a per se label or a rule of reason approach. Con-
sider the National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States9'
decision. That case probably 92 held the defendant society's ban on com-
petitive bidding per se illegal. 93 Justice Stevens quickly labeled the re-
straint illegal "[oln its face" 94 after observing that "no elaborate industry
analysis is required to demonstrate the anticompetitive character of such
an agreement.' 95 This approach was consistent with that taken by the
lower courts in the litigation. Although the trial court admitted proof con-
cerning member participation in interstate commerce and the history of
the bidding prohibition, it refused to enter a finding on the effect of the
alleged restraint because the ban was "on its face a tampering with the
price structure of engineering fees in violation of Section 1 of the Sher-
90. 441U.S. at20.
91. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
92. Courts and commentators have differed as to whether Professional Engineers was a per se or
rule of reason decision. In Catalano. Inc. v. Target Sales. Inc., the Supreme Court refers to the
agreement in Professional Engineers as "unlawful per se." i.e.. "unlawful without requiring further
inquiry." 446 U.S. at 647. For recent cases classifying Professional Engineers as per se illegal, see
Bell v. Cherokee Aviation Corp.. 660 F.2d 1123, 112.5-27 (6th Cir. 1981): General Cinema Corp %
Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 532 F. Supp. 1244, 1256 (C.D. Cal. 1982). For contradictory recent read-
ings of Professional Engineers as a rule of reason case, see Larry V. Muko. Inc. v. Southwestern Pa.
Building and Const. Trades Council, 670 F.2d 421, 432-33 (3rd Cir. 1982). cert. denied. 459 U.S.
916 (1982): Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Corp.. 585 F.2d 877. 891 (8th Cir. 1978).
For commentators classifying Professional Engineers as per se. see, e.g.. Note. Antitrust Per Se or
Rule of Reason: The Right of Engineers to Formulate Bidding Policies as a Learted Profession. 28
DEPAUL L. REV 1141, 1158 (1979): Note, Per Se Rule Applied to Ethical Canon Against Competi-
tive Bidding, 62 MARQ L. REV- 260, 267, 269 (1978). For contrary commentary, see. e.g.. Redlich.
The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB L. REV. 1, 36 (1979): Sullivan & Wiley. Recent
Antitrust Developments: Defining the Scope of Exemptions. Expanding Coverage. and Refining the
Rule of Reason. 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV 265. 323-25 (1979).
93. This holding undercuts another ill-conceived per se generalization that professional group
restraints cannot be per se illegal. Born in an amorphous dictum in Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar.
421 U.S. 773. 787-88 n. 17 (1975), this notion has little economic merit. The strong ties that bind
professional groups can create cartel-like power in seemingly competitive industries. For another
leading case applying the per se approach to professional groups. see Arizona v. Maricopa County
Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
94. 435 U.S. 679, 693 (1978).
95. ld. at 692.
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man Act.', 96 The District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
this aspect of the trial court ruling since the ban was "illegal without re-
gard to claimed or possible benefits. ", 97 Yet despite an apparent per se
classification of the bidding ban, the Court's Professional Engineers
opinion gave careful attention to anticompetitive impact.
Immediately after terming the prohibition on bidding illegal "[o]n its
face, '"98 the Professional Engineers Court assessed the restraint's anti-
competitive impact. The Court acknowledged that competitive bidding
could be "inherently imprecise" and yield an inferior product. The Court
also conceded that a particular purchaser might decide that his interest in
a quality product would deter him from obtaining multiple bids. Justice
Stevens then concluded that "[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative
judgment that ultimately competition will not only produce lower prices,
but also better goods and services." 99 Accordingly, a ban on competitive
bidding would not be justified under the rule of reason since buyers need
the efficiency of "the free opportunity to select among alternative of-
fers."' 00 Justice Stevens concluded this examination by asserting that
"the Rule of Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption
that competition itself is unreasonable." 10'
One can debate whether the Stevens opinion was per se or rule of rea-
son. Since the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's summary treat-
ment of the issue and characterized the restraint illegal "[o]n its face,'"the
case smacks of per se treatment. Yet Justice Stevens went on to analyze
the restraint as illegal even under the rule of reason. Perhaps Justice Ste-
vens only gave attention to the rule of reason as a means of rejecting the
defendant's rule of reason contentions. Justice Blackmun's concurring
opinion criticizes the majority as "holding that ethical norms can pass
muster under the Rule of Reason only if they promote competi-
tion . . . ' 102
To bicker about whether the opinion is a per se or rule of reason hold-
ing is to miss the most important message of this case: all restraints are to
receive competitive impact analysis. The Stevens opinion itself empha-
sized this point. After declaring that "there are, thus, two complementary
categories of antitrust analysis" and briefly discussing the difference
between per se and rule of reason treatment, Stevens observed that "[in
96. 389F. Supp. 1193, 1200 (D.D.C. 1974).
97. 555 F.2d 978, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
98. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. at 693.
99. Id. at 694.
100. Id.
101. Id.at696.
102. Id. at 701 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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either event, the purpose of the analysis is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint .... " 103
Even the per se Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.l0 4 decision sup-
ports the idea of a threshold competitive impact examination in every an-
titrust case. The Catalano opinion reversed a Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals decision affirming part of a trial court pre-trial order that refused to
classify an alleged restraint as per se illegal. In Catalano, the plaintiff
class of beer retailers alleged that defendant competitor wholesalers con-
spired to eliminate previously granted short-term credit. The Ninth Cir-
cuit refused to classify the restraint as "manifestly anticompetitive" and
observed that "an agreement fixing non-price trade items may either help
or hurt competition ...... 105 The Ninth Circuit majority employed the
rule of reason and specified that an approach to eliminate credit could
promote new competition by removing a potential barrier to entry and
produce a price more "visible" to buyers. 106 The Supreme Court, in a per
curiam decision, reversed the Court of Appeals and approved unequivo-
cally the analysis of Judge Blumenfeld, who dissented in the Ninth Cir-
cuit. Judge Blumenfeld had reasoned that the alleged restraint to elimi-
nate credit was "so plainly anticompetitive in its nature and necessary
effect" that no complicated analysis of reasonableness was needed. 107
After reciting the seemingly necessary classification cliches, 108 the Su-
preme Court went on to articulate that the alleged agreement would have
a definite impact upon price.
Although it would have been judicially acceptable to then conclude a
typically short per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court's examination of
the alleged restraint's impact supports the newer approach requiring com-
petitive impact analysis of most restraints. For example, the per curiam
opinion equated credit terms as "an inseparable part of the price" after
similarly equating an extension of interest-free credit to a discounted
price. 109 The Court then went on to analyze the already condemned re-
straint by using a yardstick earlier thought appropriate only for rule of
reason cases: the opinion acknowledged that the restraint could
"ultimately lead" to decreased prices in a more competitive market but
103. Id. at 692 (emphasis added).
104. 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
105. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales. Inc. 605 F.2d 1097. 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing L.
SULLIVAN. HANDBOOK OFTHE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 99. at 277 (1977)).
106. 605 F.2d at 1099. Judge Sneed's second efficiency justification regarding a more visible
price is merely the idea of creating a more perfect market where buyers and sellers have plentiful
information regarding price and product quality.
107. Id. at 1104 (Blumenfeld, J.. dissenting).
108. Catalano. Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc.. 446 U.S. 643. 646-47 (1980).
109. Id. at 648.
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cautioned "that is surely not necessarily to be anticipated." 10 The re-
straint, eliminating credit sales, appeared more likely to extinguish "one
form of competition among the sellers." "' The Court concluded its short
but careful restraint impact analysis by observing that the potential infor-
mation function of the restraint occurs in any cartel price fixing endeavor.
The 1982 Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society"12 opinion
eliminates any doubt regarding the methodological overlaps between the
per se and rule of reason approaches. Maricopa held that physician-set
maximum fees, claimed as full payment for health services provided to
insured policyholders, were illegal per se under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. A careful analysis of the Maricopa use of the per se term, however,
reveals a per se test that smacks of the rule of reason.
Using strong prosecutorial language, Justice Stevens' opinion initially
rejected consideration of defendant's efforts to advance procompetitive
justifications supporting the alleged restraint. The attempt to present such
reasonableness defenses to a price-fixing charge represented "a misun-
derstanding of the per se concept." 113 The opinion then proceeded to ana-
lyze exactly what it had just refused to consider: Justice Stevens evaluated
defendants' procompetitive justifications and found them lacking.
The defendant contended that the fee schedules were beneficial since
"they make it possible to provide consumers of health care with a
uniquely desirable form of insurance coverage that could not otherwise
exist" including "choice of doctors, complete insurance coverage, and
lower premiums." 114 Justice Stevens' majority opinion showed that the
Court was plainly unimpressed with these efficiency arguments. Freedom
to choose a doctor and complete coverage were "hardly unique to these
plans. '" 115 The Court also asserted that "[s]ince only about 70% of the
doctors in the relevant market are [foundation] members," insurance is
only "complete" for about 70% 116 of all doctor visits in Maricopa
County. Although the majority acknowledged the possibility that a fee
schedule would ease the insurer's task of calculating risks to ultimately
develop a reimbursement level, 117 it refused to justify the fee setting since
"it is not necessary that the doctors do the price fixing."!18 Justice Ste-
110. Id. at 649 (emphasis added). The test that a restraint be necessary to achieve its pro-
competitive purpose is, of course, the venerable doctrine of ancillary restraints. See Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (Taft, J.).
111. Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 649 (1980).
112. 457 U.S. 332 (1982).
113. Id. at 351.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 351-52.
117. Id. at 352 n.25.
118. Id. at 352 (emphasis added; footnote omitted). The italicized language is characteristic of a
Washington Law Review
vens noted that an Arizona state agency had properly set the maximum
fee schedule for a program providing medical care to foster children: this
program was administered by the defendant Maricopa County Founda-
tion. Similarly, Justice Stevens identified alternatives such as health in-
surance price setting, reimbursement policymaking, and contract negotia-
tions with participant physicians in analogous Blue Shield litigation
before the Supreme Court in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal
Drug Co.119
In Maricopa, however, the only major pro-efficiency argument the ma-
jority was willing to acknowledge was that doctors "may be able to [fix
maximum prices] more efficiently than insurers." 120 Finding the "valid-
ity" of this efficiency argument "far from obvious," the court dismissed
this contention since "[i]t is entirely possible that the potential or actual
power of the foundations to dictate the terms of such insurance plans may
more than offset the theoretical efficiencies upon which the respondents'
defense ultimately rests." 12 1 As support for this proposition, the Court
pointed out that the maximum fees were being set by a group with sub-
stantial power in the market for medical services when, in contrast.
"there is competition among insurance companies in the sale of medical
insurance. "122
It is apparent that the Maricopa Court conducted a "facial" examina-
tion of the competitive impact of the alleged restraint and found it ex-
tremely likely to be anticompetitive. Accordingly, the Court labeled the
fee setting arrangement illegal per se. The Court conducted a "facial"
analysis of the alleged restraint without explaining its methodology. The
amicus curiae brief of the United States argued specifically that the Su-
preme Court had earlier authorized a "quick look" at an alleged re-
straint's competitive effects prior to categorizing a restraint as either rule
of reason or per se. 123 Indeed, the Supreme Court's refusal to consider the
rule of reason inquiry under the approach of Addyston Pipe. See infra text accompanying notes
133-36.
119. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
120. Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 353.
121. Id. at 353-54 (footnote omitted).
122. Id. at 354 n.29.
123. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 20-21. Arizona v. Maricopa Count.
Med. Soc'y. 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (calling for "quick look" at competitive impact): see also Harri-
son, Price Fixing, the Professions, and Ancillar' Restraint: Coping with Maricopa County, 1982 U.
ILL L. REV 925, 937. The Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice continued to
press for the "quick look" method in recent friend of the court briefs. See Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae, National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla.. 46
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG- REP (BNA) 488. 490-91 (1984); Brief on Petition for Writ of Certiorari for
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10, 11. Northwest Wholesale Stationers. Inc. v. Pacific Sta-
tionery and Printing Co., 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted. 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (U.S.
Nov. 2. 1984) (No. 83-1368).
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restraint procompetitive appeared premised upon a quick conclusion that
the alleged restraint was not a necessary feature to competitor collabora-
tion. 124 The Court's use of this variant of the rule of reason in a per se
case illustrates the merger of the rule of reason and per se methods.
The procedural context of the Maricopa litigation is significant. The
Maricopa Court employed a facial examination of the alleged restraint
without a detailed trial record. The appeal arose after the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed trial court denial of the plaintiff state's motion
for summary judgment on this issue of antitrust liability. The Court's use
of the "facial" approach without a full trial record signals that lower
courts may be free to analyze restraints facially upon motions for sum-
mary judgment. Although the Supreme Court has urged previously that
summary judgment be used sparingly in antitrust litigation, 125 the Burger
Court's increased attention to efficient use of judicial resources 126 mani-
fests itself in a willingness to endorse careful use of antitrust summary
judgment through the facial examination approach.
The Supreme Court's continued use of the "facial examination" test is
apparent in the June 1984 National Collegiate Athletic Association v.
Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma opinion. 127 There, the
Court held, seven-to-two, that the existing N.C.A.A. television contract
violated the Sherman Act under the rule of reason since it reduced mem-
ber output, restrained member prices, and frustrated the ability of mem-
ber institutions to respond to consumer preferences. Justice Stevens'
opinion offered this explanation for substituting a rule of reason test for
the Court of Appeals'128 per se approach: "Our analysis of this case under
the Rule of Reason, of course, does not change the ultimate focus of our
inquiry. Both per se rules and the Rule of Reason are employed 'to form a
judgment about the competitive significance of the restraint.' "129 The
Stevens opinion further clarified the similarity between the rule of reason
and a per se test by observing that under either approach "the essential
inquiry remains the same-whether or not the challenged restraint en-
hances competition.' 130 In a penetrating footnote, Justice Stevens
explained that "there is often no bright line separating per se from Rule
124. See infra note 131 for a discussion of the least restrictive alternative approach.
125. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464,473 (1962).
126. See, e.g., Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981); Parklane
Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 (1979).
127. 104S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
128. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d
1147, 1152 (10th Cir. 1983), affid, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
129. 104 S. Ct. at 2962 (citing National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
679,692 (1978)).
130. 104 S. Ct. at 2962 (footnote omitted).
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of Reason analysis" into market conditions. 131 While the Board of Re-
gents of the Universit, of Oklahoma decision illuminates Burger Court
antitrust methodology, it stops short of expressly utilizing the "quick
look" language sought by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division's
amicus curiae brief. 132 This is unfortunate. Explicit use of the "quick
look" terminology should aid lower courts and attorneys unfamiliar with
antitrust methodology and correct the all-too-popular misunderstanding
that the rule of reason and per se approaches are polar opposites. None-
theless, Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma so clearly adopts
a "quick look" type method that the bench and bar should soon learn that
per se and rule of reason are complementary terms possessing a similar
competitive impact analysis.
Seasoned antitrust lawyers recognize that the threshold facial examina-
tion step is not that novel and is entirely consistent with older landmark
cases. United States v. Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. 133 evidences the his-
torical foundation underlying the quick look method. Writing for the
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Taft found illegal the cartel market
division and bid rigging by six manufacturers of cast iron pipe. The de-
fendants argued that the resulting prices were reasonable. Taft's lucid ap-
proach to illegality distinguished between reasonable and "naked" re-
straints:
[lit would certainly seem to follow from the tests laid down for determining
the validity of such an agreement that no conventional restraint of trade can
be enforced unless the covenant embodying it is merely ancillary to the
main purpose of a lawful contract, and necessary to protect the covenantee
in the enjoyment of the legitimate fruits of the contract, or to protect him
from the dangers of an unjust use of those fruits by the other party .... But
where the sole object of both parties in making the contract as expressed
therein is merely to restrain competition, and enhance or maintain prices, it
would seem that there was nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it
would necessarily have a tendency to monopoly, and therefore would be
void. 134
In Taft's words, to assess reasonableness of a naked restraint designed
for no other purpose than to eliminate competition was to "set sail on a
sea of doubt." 135 An ancillary restraint, one necessary and subordinate to
131. Id. n.26. Justice Stevens articulated the converse of this important point in a subsequent
footnote by quoting Professor Areeda's cogent observation that the rule of reason can sometimes be
applied in the "twinkling of an eye." 104 S. Ct. at 2965 n.39 (citing P. Areeda. The 'Rule of Rea-
son' in Antitrust Analysis: General Issues 37-38 (Fed. Judicial Center June 1981 )).
132. See 46 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP_ (BNA) 488. 490-91 (1984).
133. 85F. 271(6th Cir. 1898),modified. 175 U.S. 211(1899).
134. 85 F. at 282-83.
135. Id. at 283-84.
Vol. 60:1. 1984
Streamlining Antitrust Litigation
a different and legitimate business transaction, would be lawful. 136 Using
this test, Taft termed both the reasonableness of the restraint and defen-
dants' prices unimportant. In classifying the restraint as naked and, ac-
cordingly, illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Taft reversed a
circuit court decision dismissing the complaint and put teeth in his
"naked" categorization by ordering the trial court to enter a decree for
the government "perpetually enjoining" the restraint.137 Accordingly,
the Addyston Pipe decision showed a genuine concern with avoiding un-
necessary trials and adopted a methodology that permitted courts to make
a pre-trial judgment on the legality of an alleged restraint.
Other early Supreme Court antitrust cases created an appropriate policy
to streamline antitrust cases. In United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight
Association,138 Justice Peckham refused to consider defendant's argu-
ment that cartel-set prices were reasonable and rejected the defense as a
matter of law. In United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 139 the Court
refused to hear the contention that a cartel was needed to stop "perni-
cious" competition.
Burger Court antitrust decisions give credence to and apply the Addys-
ton Pipe doctrine of ancillary restraints. National Society of Professional
Engineers v. United States140 discussed the doctrine thoroughly and prop-
erly traced it back to the common law. 141 The Addyston Pipe contribution
to antitrust methodology was cited and directly employed in the Maricopa
decision. Justice Stevens premised his Maricopa per se rule upon the con-
clusion that the restraint was not "necessary"; 142 this analysis smacks of
the Addyston Pipe method. Similarly, Broadcast Music, while not even
citing Addyston, reached its conclusion using the ancillary restraint ap-
proach. There, the court held that the blanket license was not a "naked
restraint." Rather, the court noted, it "accompanies the integration of
sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright
use. " 
143
136. Id. at 282-83. In important dicta, Taft illustrated that although a partnership could reduce
competition among its members, this result was ancillary to the efficient "union of their capital,
enterprise, and energy to carry on a successful business." Id. at 280. See R. BORK, supra note 53, at
27-28. Judge Bork terms the Addyston Pipe decision "one of the greatest, if not the greatest, antitrust
opinions in the history of the law." Id. at 26.
137. Addyston Pipe, 85 F. at 302.
138. 166 U.S. 290, 331-32 (1897).
139. 273 U.S. 392 (1927); accord, United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S.
290,330-32(1897).
140. 435 U.S. 679, 688-90(1978).
141. Id. at 688-89 (citing Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181,24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711)).
142. 457 U.S. 332, 352(1982).
143. 441 U.S. 1, 20 (1979). Both United States v. Topco Ass'n., 405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972), and
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963), characterize horizontal restraints as
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Modern use of the doctrine of ancillary restraints can be seen clearly in
Justice Rehnquist's dissent from the denial of certiorari in National Foot-
ball League v. North American Soccer League.144 The denial of review
left standing a Second Circuit holding that the N.F.L. cross-ownership
rule, prohibiting team owners from holding a controlling interest in other
major professional sports teams, was illegal under the rule of reason.
Rehnquist termed the restraint "largely a matter of necessity" and analo-
gized to the Addyston Pipe notion of a "covenant by joint venturers who
produce a single product not to compete with one another." 45
Some lower courts have utilized the quick look or facial examination
approach. Judge Larson's dissent to the Ninth Circuit's Maricopa opinion
is illustrative. Citing National Society of Professional Engineers, 146
Judge Larson viewed the maximum fee schedule as "so plainly anticom-
petitive that it is an unreasonable restraint of trade on its face."'147 He
characterized the defendant's fee-setting arrangements as "naked price
restraints" requiring per se treatment and emphasized physicians' "long
history of resisting any challenge to fee-for-service medicine" and the
need to decrease the power of doctors in relation to medical consumers
and insurance carriers. 148 Employing the quick look approach, Judge Lar-
son avoided a "detailed economic analysis" and condemned such an in-
quiry as "not always necessary to understand the purpose or effect of a
particular activity." 149
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit's use of the facial examination methodol-
ogy in United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc. 150 merits careful scrutiny.
There, the Court of Appeals reversed a trial court grant of summary judg-
ment for the defendant. The Fifth Circuit applied a "facial unreasonable-
"naked." See also Union Processing Corp. v. Atkin, 104 S Ct. 1316. 1317 (1984) (White. J.. dis-
senting from a denial of certiorari).
144. 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
145. National Football League v. North Am. Soccer League. 459 U.S. 1074. 1075-80 (1982).
Justice Rehnquist went on to criticize the Second Circuit's apparent use of the Addyston Pipe require-
ment that the alleged restraint be "necessary to protect the covenantee.'" id. at 1078 (quoting Addys-
ton Pipe, 85 F. at 282). He viewed the Court of Appeals as improperly interpreting this requisite as a
"least restrictive alternative" test. In Justice Rehnquist's terms, all Addyston Pipe required is a
"standard of reasonableness" so that a restraint would be legal if- "reasonably necessary." 459 U.S.
at 1080 (citing Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 265 (7th Cir. 1981), Cert. denied.
455 U.S. 921 (1982); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak, 603 F.2d 263. 302 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied. 404 U.S. 1093 (1980): American Motor Inns v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 521 F.2d 1230. 1249 t3d
Cir. 1979)). Cf. Anderson v. American Auto Ass'n, 454 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1972) (alleged
restraint "fairly necessary"). For articulation of the "least restrictive alternative" approach. see
White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 270 (1963) (Brennan. J., concurring).
146. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
147. 643 F.2d 553, 569 (9th Cir. 1980) (Larson, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 563, 568.
149. Id.
150. 629 F.2d 1351 (5thCir. 1980).
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ness theory" 151 by examining the pre-trial record to determine the com-
petitive harm and benefits of the membership criteria, 152 the nature of the
defendant's control of the market, 153 and the necessity of the alleged re-
straint in relation to the defendant's operational needs. 154 While the Fifth
Circuit's facial analysis was said to be "a version of the rule of rea-
son," 155 the court articulated the competitive effect of the restraint on a
summary judgment record without the benefit of a trial with probable ex-
pert economists.
Although other lower court decisions also employ or articulate the "fa-
cial" or quick look methodology,156 the bulk of everyday antitrust deci-
sions ignore the Burger Court's new threshold analysis and, instead, con-
tinue to flounder when deciding whether to employ a rule of reason or per
se rule. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. v. Northwest Wholesale Sta-
tioners, Inc. 157 represents a typical misapplication of the per se - rule of
reason dichotomy. In Pacific Stationery, the Ninth Circuit, reversing a
trial court summary judgment for the defendant, held that a non-profit
wholesale cooperative's expulsion of a member was per se illegal because
the expulsion lacked any procedural safeguards. Citing numerous cases
characterizing group boycotts as illegal per se, 158 the Court of Appeals
applied a per se method with knee-jerk rapidity. Instead of facially exam-
ining the restraint for procompetitive and anticompetitive considerations,
the Ninth Circuit (1) labeled the restraint a group boycott, (2) noted pre-
cedent that group boycotts are per se illegal, (3) found no statement of
151. Id. at 1369-87.
152. Membership criteria alleged to be illegal were:
(1) restricting membership to those applicants receiving an affirmative vote by existing mem-
bers,
(2) requiring new members to purchase stock in the defendant organization at a price set by
the defendant's board of directors,
(3) restricting membership to realtors in Muscogee County, Georgia,
(4) requiring applicants to have an office open during normal business hours,
(5) requiring new members to possess a favorable business reputation and credit report, and
(6) restricting membership to brokers in business for at least six months.
Id. at 1358-59.
153. Id. at 1372-74.
154. Id. at 1374-87 (under the heading "Standards for Facial Evaluation") (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 1369. See also L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAWOF ANTrrRUST 196 (1977) (per se
rule "a special case of the rule of reason analysis").
156. See United States v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 412, 432-33
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (facial examination one of tests used to enjoin restraint as unreasonable); Board of
Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. National Collegiate Althletic Ass'n, 707 F.2d 1147, 1161 (10th Cir.
1983), affd, 104 S. Ct. 2948 (1984).
157. 715 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. granted, 53 U.S.L.W. 3235 (Nov. 2, 1984) (No. 83-
1368).
158. 715 F.2d at 1395 (citing Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Klor's
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959); Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941)).
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reasons supporting the expulsion, and (4) refused to conduct any analysis
of the alleged restraint's competitive impact. 159
Such an analysis contradicts squarely the facial examination conducted
by the Pacific Stationety trial court. Faced with cross motions for sum-
mary judgment, the trial judge reviewed the evidence presented and
found "no showing" of any anticompetitive effect.160 The Court of Ap-
peals patently ignored this facial examination of competitive impact and
concluded summarily that the lack of procedural safeguards accompany-
ing the expulsion permitted automatic use of a per se label. 161 In so doing,
the Ninth Circuit overlooked a record devoid of evidence that the defen-
dant controlled a significant percentage of the market. In essence, the
court disregarded substantial authority requiring that the per se label be
applied only to those group boycotts affecting a substantial control of the
market. 162
Pacific Stationer, is not alone in ignoring the proper facial examination
threshold test and substituting an amorphous but speedy technique in
deciding whether to use a per se or rule of reason approach.163 Sadly.
numerous cases ignore the potential for avoiding unnecessary and expen-
159. 715 F.2d at 1396-98. Suprisingly, Judge Ferguson's opinion referred to earlier Ninth Cir-
cuit precedent requiring a balancing of competitive effects in group boycott cases. 715 F.2d at 1396
(citing Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir.
1969). cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); and Ron Tonkin Gran Turismo v. Fiat Distributors. 637
F.2d 1376 (9th Cir. 1981). cert. denied, 454 U.S. 831 (1981)). and then refused to balance pro and
anticompetitive impacts since the plaintiff was deemed a competitor of the defendant.
160. Pacific Stationery & Printing v. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc.. Civil No. 80-935
(D. Ore. Dec. 21, 1981) (unreported bench opinion quoted in Petition for Writ of Cert.. Northwest
Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co.. 52 U.S.L.W. 3652. 3737 (April
10, 1984) (No. 83-1368). Appendix 23-24.
161. 715 F.2dat 1398.
162. See, e.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exchange. 373 U.S. 341. 347, 359. (1963) (dictum
that actions of defendant Exchange, an entity possessing "immense economic power." would consti-
tute a per se violation "in a context free from other federal regulation"): Fashion Originators' Guild
of Am., Inc., v. F.T.C.. 312 U.S. 457, 466-67 (1941) (illegal per se where defendants possess
significant control of the market); Ron Tonkin Grand Turismo v. Fiat Distributors. Inc.. 637 F 2d
1376, 1388 (9th Cir. 1981) (rule of reason applied to an alleged group boycott of defendants holding
an insignificant market share), cert. denied. 454 U.S. 831 (1981). Even Klors, Inc. v. Broadway-
Hale Stores, Inc.. 359 U.S. 207 (1959), a bellweather per se group boycott holding, relied on some
significant market analysis since it found genuine economic imbalance between the plaintiff and "a
wide (defendant] combination consisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer" 359 U.S. 207.
213. For criticism of the per se rule's use in group boycotts, see R. BORK. supra note 53. at 330-44.
Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals To Deal: A Rule Ripe For Reexamination. 79 COLtut
L. REv. 685 (1979); Horsley, Per Se Illegality and Concerted Refusals To Deal. 13 B.C. IND. &
COMm- L. REV. 484 (1972).
163. See e.g., United States v. Topco, 405 U.S. 596 (1972): Hyde v. Jefferson Parish Hosp.
Dist. No. 2, 686 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1982). rev'd. 104 S. Ct. 1551 (1984): C.B.S.. Inc. v. ASCAP.
562 F.2d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 1977), rev'd. 441 U.S. I (1979): Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
Corp., 684 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1982), affd and modified. 104 S. Ct. 1464 (1984): Westman Com-
mission Co. v. Hobart Corp., 461 F. Supp. 627 (D. Colo. 1978).
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sive rule of reason trials through pre-trial facial examination of an alleged
restraint's competitive impact.
Such cases disregard the Supreme Court's blurring of the distinction
between the rule of reason and the per se approaches. In order to properly
classify a restraint, a court now must engage in a pre-trial measurement of
the economic impact underlying the restraint. This development shows
the dominance of competitive impact analysis in modem antitrust analy-
sis. Rather than reserving economic examination of a restraint only for
rule of reason litigation, the Burger Court may be requiring some thresh-
old competitive impact analysis of all restraints in order to determine
whether to apply the rule of reason or a per se rule.
III. CONCLUSION: POSITIVE JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
POLICY CONSEQUENCES DERIVING FROM A THRESHOLD
ANALYSIS OF COMPETITIVE IMPACT
In a nutshell, the Burger Court has redefined the per se - rule of reason
dichotomy. The Court's shift to economic analysis of a restraint now au-
thorizes a threshold examination or quick look at an alleged restraint. If
the restraint is clearly anticompetitive, a per se approach is appropriate.
Conversely, if the restraint appears necessary to achieve a procompetitive
result, then a more complete rule of reason inquiry is in order. Although
sometimes citing the cumbersome balancing approach to the rule of rea-
son, the Court, in fact, seems to be using the old Addyston Pipe doctrine
of ancillary restraints. A rule of reason trial now focuses on whether the
alleged restraint was an essential or necessary feature to a procompetitive
plan. In short, the rule of reason trial is quite similar to the facial exami-
nation. Each emphasizes competitive impact and each seeks a restraint no
more broadly anticompetitive than necessary.
To be sure, this methodological change has potential risks. A "quick
look" or facial examination in the hands -of the wrong judge may reach
incorrect conclusions. Also, the "quick look" could be accomplished so
summarily that it would be identical to the previous per se labeling pro-
cess. 164
While it is always possible such methodological errors could occur, the
new approach, properly applied, represents a substantial improvement.
First, the "quick look" or "facial examination" avoids the low-level la-
beling that characterizes automatic, non-analytical application of a per se
norm. 165 Since the "facial" methodology requires identification of pro-
164. Cf. Note, The Facial Unreasonableness Theory: Filling the Void Benveen Per Se and Rule
of Reason, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 729 (1981). This first legal commentary upon the facial approach
correctly perceived the advantages of facial examination. However, the Note incorrectly designates
the facial methodology as a "middle tier standard," id. at 730, falling between the per se and rule of
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competitive and anticompetitive efficiencies, it is very unlikely that its
employment would result in an undesirable knee-jerk application of a per
se rule. Instead, the decision to use a per se approach would be made after
analysis. Similarly, decisions to use a rule of reason approach would be
made after some inquiry and would eschew the rather summary and po-
tentially confusing notion that the rule be employed because of judicial
inexperience with the particular restraint.
Second, the new methodology interjects some economic analysis into
every antitrust case and, in a sense, assures a desirable blend of substan-
tive economic policy with procedural efficiency needed to push any litiga-
tion to conclusion. One of the greatest problems associated with prior
approaches to classifying restraints has been the methodological inability
to assimilate economic policy and the tendency to rely, instead, upon
slippery shorthand criteria. 166 Given the new requirement that all re-
straints be evaluated for efficiency, it is unlikely that consumer welfare,
the primary goal of antitrust policy, 1 67 will be ignored.
Third, the new approach holds excellent promise for streamlining anti-
trust litigation. A facial examination of a restraint should be conducted
before trial in order to determine whether or not an expensive and time-
consuming rule of reason trial is really needed. The pre-trial conference is
the ideal forum for a facial examination. The 1983 revision of Federal
Rule 16 facilitates the new methodology with its new emphasis on the
"avoidance of unnecessary proof and of cumulative evidence." 168 Com-
bined with the general spirit of the revised rule, which encourages "ex-
pediting" the trial and "establishing early and continuing [judicial] con-
trol,' ' 169 this emphasis should permit the parties and court to conduct a
reason approaches, and ignores major Supreme Court litigation such as Catalano. Inc. v. Target Sales
Inc.. 446 U.S. 643 (1980), and National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States. 435 U S. 679
(1978), which support the facial examination threshold step.
165. For a good example of a properly applied "facial examination," see United States v. Realty
Multi-List, 629 F.2d 1351. 1369-87 (5th Cir. 1980): cf. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons. Inc. v. Hawai-
ian Oke and Liquors. Ltd., 416 F.2d 71,79 (9th Cir. 1969).
166. E.g., considerable past experience and "'pernicious" restraints. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 16-66.
167. R. BORK, supra note 53. at 81-89 (consumer welfare goal underlying antitrust policy supe-
rior to other goals): R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976): Bork. The Rule
of Reason and Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division 1I. 75 YALE L.J. 373. 376-77
(1966); Bork and Bowman, The Crisis in Antitrust. 65 COLUM L. REv 363. 369-70 (1965). Contra.
Redlich, supra note 92; Blake and Jones, Toward A Three-Dinensional Antitrust Policy. 65 COLUMI
L. REV 422,439 (1965).
168. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(4). Although this subject matter of pre-trial discussion appears to be a
permissive and not mandatory topic, it is likely that antitrust pre-trials will regularly focus on avoid-
ing unnecessary proof. See Advisory Committee Note to 1983 Amendment of Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. 97
F.R.D. 165, 205, 207 (1983) ("amended rule makes . . .case management an express goal of pre-
trial procedure").
169. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(l) and (2).
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facial examination within the pre-trial conferences. The 1983 revisions of
Rule 16 and an early determination of whether an antitrust case should be
evaluated under a per se or rule of reason approach have an identical goal:
the accelerated and more efficient management of complex litigation. 170
The facial examination is an appropriate response to the growing pressure
to include mandatory subject matter for consideration in pre-trial confer-
ences of complex cases. 171 Every antitrust case should include a pre-trial
conference discussion of whether to apply the rule of reason or per se
approach. The facial examination of an alleged restraint facilitates early
consideration of this issue. Once the court decides upon an appropriate
antitrust methodology-rule of reason or per se-discovery is shaped
productively to either the narrow parameters associated with a per se rule
or the freewheeling, broad scope of the rule of reason. The potential re-
duction of discovery associated with the mandatory consideration of anti-
trust methodology at a pre-trial conference is consistent with a major pur-
pose of revised rule 16, "discouraging wasteful pre-trial activities." 172
The motion for summary judgment, often a topic at pre-trial confer-
ences, provides a ready mechanism for employing a quick look methodol-
ogy. While the Warren Court cautioned against easy application of sum-
mary judgment in antitrust cases, 173 more recent Supreme Court cases
have repeatedly authorized the use of summary judgment in antitrust
litigation. 174 Summary judgment, and, in particular, partial summary
judgment, 175 provide sorely needed streamlining of antitrust litigation.
Pragmatic acknowledgement of the lethargic course of antitrust litiga-
tion has led thoughtful federal courts and recent commentators to embrace
antitrust summary judgments. 176 Indeed, a recent Sixth Circuit decision
170. See Advisory Committees Note, supra note 168 at 209 ("[i]ncreased judicial control during
the pre-trial process accelerates the processing and termination of cases"). For illustration of pre-trial
application of a facial examination following plaintiff's motion for per se treatment, see Catalano,
Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 605 F.2d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 643 (1980).
171. See Brazil, Improving Judicial Control Over the Pretrial Development of Civil Actions:
Model Rulesfor Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 A.B.F. RES. J. 873, 918.
172. Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a); see also Brazil, supra note 171, at 918 (pre-trial conference of com-
plex case should establish discovery guidelines).
173. Pollerv. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
174. First National Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968); Arizona v.
Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982); see also Skoda v. A & W Distrib. Co., 414 F.
Supp. 1209 (D. Tex. 1976); California Distrib. Co. v. Bay Distrib., Inc. 337 F. Supp. 1154 (D. Fla.
1971); 2 P. AREEDA & D. TuRNER, ANrrrRusT LAW § 316 (1978) ("[Courts are accustomed to
granting summary judgment in favor of a plaintiff when the defendant's conduct falls unambiguously
within a rule of perse illegality and refusing summary judgment when it does not.").
175. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
176. See Shop & Save Food Markets, Inc. v. Pneumo Corp., 683 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1038 (1981); Weit v. Continental-Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 641 F.2d
457, 464 (7th Cir. 1981) (summary judgment useful in antitrust litigation since courts "simply cannot
turn [their] heads and ignore the practical realities of complex anti-trust litigation"); Cemuto Inc. v.
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reversing a trial court summary judgment gratuitously invited the appellee
and the trial court to attempt a second summary judgment disposition
"after development of the necessary facts." 177
A quick look approach can be integrated into a summary judgment dis-
position. The decision whether to apply a per se or rule of reason method
is a question of law for the court. 178 In the recent Jefferson Parish Hospi-
tal District No. 2 v. HIyde opinion, the Supreme Court described the per
se approach as one in which alleged restraints "are deemed unreasonable
as a matter of law." 179 The facial examination's emphasis upon competi-
tive consequences can be integrated into a motion for summary judgment.
Affidavits supporting and attacking a summary judgment motion should
provide facts relating to procompetitive and anticompetitive features of an
alleged restraint and can permit a court to determine whether the anticom-
petitive impact of the alleged restraint is broader than necessary. There is
no need for a full plenary trial in order to decide whether to apply a per se
or rule of reason approach. Indeed, those cases that apply a per se rule
after having held a full trial usually represent an unwarranted expenditure
of judicial resources. 18 0
Ideally, economists' expert affidavits should also play a beneficial role
in a facial examination summary judgment motion. The economist's writ-
ten statement, a regular feature of administrative agency adjudications.' 8'
could work efficiently in a motion for summary judgment. The plaintiff's
economist would be expected to interpret the evidence to show anticom-
petitive impact and the defendant's economist would counter with a pro-
United Cabinet Corp., 595 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1979): Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co.. 586 F.2d
1163. 1167 (7th Cir. 1978). cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979) (very nature of antitrust litigation
encourages summary disposition when permissible): Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. lndust.
Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1140 n.53 (D. Pa. 1981), affd it part and rev'd in part in In re Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983): Skoda v. A & W Distrib. Co..
414 F. Supp 1209 (D. Tex. 1976); California Distrib. Co. v. Bay Distrib.. Inc.. 337 F. Supp. 1154
(D. Fla. 1971). For commentary supporting increased use of summary judgments in antitrust litiga-
tion, see 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER. supra note 174 § 316: Report of consultant to House Judiciary
Committee on Study of Antitrust Treble Damage Remedy. 46 ANRITRUST & TRADE REG REP (BNAI
356, 367 (1984): Blecher and Carlo. supra note 14. at 75 1: Blecher and Woodhead. supra note 14. at
527-28. Note, Conscious Parallelism: The Business Judgment Defense in a Summnarv Judgment Con-
text. 35 HASTINGS L.J. 115, 119-20 (1983).
177. Smith v. Northern Mich. Hosp.. Inc., 703 F.2d 942. 954 n.26 (6th Cir. 1983).
178. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States. 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (Justice Brandeis articulates
and applies rule of reason to uphold defendant's call rule and orders trial court to dismiss complaint):
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898). modified. 175 U.S. 211
(1899) (task of applying doctrine of ancillary restraints clearly awarded to court rather than jury).
179. 104S. Ct. 1551, 1556(1984).
180. See authorities cited supra note 7.
181. Liberal evidentiary rules in agencies permit broad use of expert testimony in summary pro-
ceedings. See. e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 22.22(c) (1983) (Environmental Protection Agency hearing proce-
dure permitting verified statement).
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competitive interpretation of the evidence. While classic courtroom
cross-examination would be unavailable, the device of supplementary af-
fidavits, specifically placed within judicial discretion by Rule 56(e),' 82
should provide a mechanism much like cross-examination. Through sup-
plemental affidavits, each expert could evaluate and criticize the expert
testimony of his or her expert opponent.
Unfortunately, the propriety of expert affidavits in antitrust summary
judgment motions is in real doubt. Rule 56(e) requires affidavits to be
"made on personal knowledge. ' 183 Numerous cases construe this lan-
guage to ban regular consideration of expert affidavits in summary judg-
ment dispositions. 184 Nonetheless, a few cases permit expert testimony to
be considered in summary judgement affidavits. Where expert'testimony
is particularly crucial to a specific issue, courts have been willing to cre-
ate an exception to the "personal knowledge" requisite. 185 This excep-
tion makes particularly good sense where the expert's testimony is merely
corroborating proof already in a summary judgment record; the Supreme
Court has hinted that consideration of the corroborating expert affidavit
would be permissible. 186 The expert witness affidavit accompanying an
antitrust facial examination partial summary judgment motion could read-
ily support or corroborate other procompetitive or anticompetitive evi-
dence in a summary judgment record; it is likely that any antitrust sum-
mary judgment disposition would involve documentary evidence.
Even without the participation of experts, pre-trial disposition of anti-
trust litigation through the facial unreasonableness method will occur. In-
creasing concern for crowded dockets and rising litigation costs combine
to pressure judicial consideration of alternatives to the expensive rule of
reason trial. The recent decision in Associated General Contractors of
California, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters reflects this
movement to streamline antitrust litigation by reaffirming the "strong in-
terest, identified in our prior cases, in keeping the scope of complex anti-
trust trials within judicially manageable limits.' 187 The Maricopa deci-
182. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e).
183. Id.
184. E.g., Mapco, Inc. v. Carter, 573 F.2d 1268 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied,
437 U.S. 904 (economist's affidavit inadmissible because conclusionary and speculative); Kern v.
Tri-State Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 754, 756 (8th Cir. 1967) (expert medical opinion inadmissible); see
generally, C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2738, at 486 (1983).
185. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 184, at 503-04; Grayson v. Aetna Ins. Co., 308 F.
Supp. 922 (D.S.C. 1970) (permitting consideration of affidavit of English professor to aid meaning
of ambiguous insurance policy).
186. See Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620 (1944) (while considering affidav-
its of interested experts in summary judgment, Supreme Court reversed grant of summary judgment
because opposing party submitted contrary testimony on a material issue of fact).
187. 459 U.S. 519, 543 (1983) (citing Sherman Act debate, 21 Cong. Rec. 3148-49 (1890)).
Washington Law Review
sion observed that the rule of reason trial "entails significant costs" since
litigating purpose and effect "is extensive and complex. ""188 Discovery
and trial are devoted to an exhaustive battle of experts and documentary
evidence regarding an alleged restraint's purpose, history, and economic
impact.
Rule of reason trials are the "stuff" of antitrust delay; the paradigmatic
battle of experts and "over-trial" characterize the proceedings. In this
context, the idea of a threshold examination of a restraint's economic ef-
fect makes great sense. Before undertaking the incredibly costly rule of
reason trial, courts should decide if such an exhaustive process is really
needed.
Associated General Contractors identified another judicial management technique for administering
complex antitrust litigation by allowing trial courts to require more detailed pleadings before permit-
ting a "potentially massive factual controversy to proceed." 459 U.S. at 528 n. 17.
188. 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
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